Wednesday, June 20, 2012

Honduras - CAFTA-DR Labor Petition Filed against Government of Honduras

U.S. Office of Trade and Labor Affairs accepts CAFTA-DR Chapter 16 labor petition filed against the Government of Honduras

By Tequila J. Brooks, Washington DC


On May 14, 2012, the Office of Trade and Labor Affairs (OTLA) accepted a petition filed by the AFL-CIO, 7 major Honduran labor federations, 18 Honduran local unions and the Centro de Derechos de Mujeres (Center for Women's Rights or CDM) alleging that the Government of Honduras has failed to effectively enforce its labor laws and is in breach of its CAFTA-DR obligation to enact labor laws that comply with ILO standards.  This is the third petition filed under Chapter 16 labor provisions of the CAFTA-DR since the agreement came into force in 2004.  On December 22, 2011, Father Christopher Hartley, a Catholic missionary, filed a petition alleging that the Government of the Dominican Republic is failing to comply with its CAFTA-DR obligations to protect the labor rights of migrant Haitian workers in Dominican sugar cane fields.  The OTLA accepted that petition on February 22, 2012 and it is currently under review.  The first CAFTA-DR Chapter 16 labor petition, filed against the Government of Guatemala in May 2008, was referred to arbitration by the U.S. Trade Representative in August 2011.  The arbitration panel has been established but the arbitrators have not yet been selected.  On April 30, 2012, the Fair Labor Association and major corporations American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., Adidas Group, Gap, Inc., Liz Claiborne, Nike Inc., Under Armour, PVH Corp., and VF Corporation sent a letter to the President of Guatemala urging his administration to resolve issues raised in the CAFTA-DR complaint and better protect Guatemalan workers' freedom of association and right to organize trade unions.

Unlike petitions filed under the NAFTA labor side agreement which tend to focus on working conditions and ineffective labor law enforcement with regard to a single factory or small handful of plants in one industry in the same state or region, the Honduran CAFTA-DR petition contains an extensive catalog of workplace violations and ineffective labor law enforcement in 19 workplaces in four major industries related to export - garment manufacturing, auto parts manufacturing, agriculture and ports administration.  While each industrial sector is characterized by unique challenges, common themes tie all of the cases together.  In addition, the petition highlights a number of threats and violent acts made against trade unionists in Honduras since the 2009 coup, including no fewer than 11 murders of trade unionists in the 2009-2011 period.  Among the victims were young female teachers and social security workers like 29-year-old Honduran Social Security Institute Workers' Union member Vanessa Zepeda, whose body was thrown from a moving car in February 2010 and Juana Bustillo, President of the Honduran Social Security Institute Workers' Union, who was shot and killed by gunmen while going home from a union meeting in the Honduran capital San Pedro Sula on September 17, 2010.

Seven of the cases discussed in the petition arose in the export manufacturing sector, most of these in garment factories.  Workplace conditions in Honduran garment factories are similar to those the world over, including excessive overtime hours, failure to pay overtime wages and gender discrimination including sexual harassment, pregnancy testing and termination in the case of pregnancy.  Gender discrimination in Honduran garment factories is systematized by a minimum wage scale that sets minimum wages in the garment industry that are significantly lower than those set for other industries in Honduras.  The cases in the petition, however, focus on workers' efforts to organize workplace unions and achieve trade union recognition from Honduran authorities.  In each of the cases outlined in the petition, workers organized a trade union committee and were fired by factory management once they achieved recognition from the Honduran labor ministry.  In at least one factory, Petralex, workers elected a half dozen 6-member union leadership committees in a period lasting over a year.  Each time the factory fired the members of the trade union leadership committee, the workers elected a new committee.  These terminations occurred before, during and after the recognition process, resulting in violations of Honduran labor laws that require trade union leaders and members' organizing activities be protected.  When Honduran labor inspectors attempted to investigate labor law violations in the factories, company security guards refused entry to them.  Petitioners argue that while workplace inspections were attempted, enforcement was ultimately ineffective as the Ministry of Labor of Honduras did not utilize police to facilitate the entry of inspectors and did not fine or otherwise penalize factory owners for violating labor laws and failing to comply with workplace inspection requirements.  When labor inspectors submitted reports of labor law violations to Ministry of Labor officials, these reports were rarely if ever acted upon.  Petitioners also argue that the Ministry of Labor facilitated the registration of an unlawful management-dominated worker organization in the case of Hanesbrands, which implemented a region-wide human resources policy of organizing company-led employee organizations referred to as "collective pacts" to avert the establishment of independent worker organizations in its plants and threatened employees with termination if they did not join - practices which are illegal under Honduran labor law.  

Most of the agricultural sector cases discussed in the petition relate to the production of food products, primarily bananas and melons, for U.S. and global markets, as well as ornamental plants.  One notable exception is the case of Fundación Hondureña de Investigación Agrícola (Honduran Foundation for Agricultural Research or FHIA), a private-public partnership supported by government and private sector businesses.  Despite finding numerous violations of Honduran labor law in the manner in which the FHIA suppressed FHIA workers' efforts to organize a union, the maximum fine levied against the organization by Honduran authorities was about $527 U.S.  Petitioners point to the low fine as an inadequate enforcement measure that shows the Government of Honduras has not enacted labor laws that comply with ILO standards as required by Chapter 16 of the CAFTA-DR.

Issues encountered in Honduran agriculture include payment by the tub of produce harvested at rates that do not meet minimum wage and overtime wage requirements, unsafe working conditions and long hours.   In one of the cases raised by petitioners, workers were being paid less than 2/3 of the minimum wage, which is 136 lempiras (a little over $7.00 US) a day, and were fined 80 lempiras ($4.00 US) if they missed a day of work.  After two years of worker complaints, a labor inspector conducted an inspection of the plant and issued a citation for lack of individual work contracts, lack of internal work rules approved by the Ministry of Labor, inadequate payroll records and minimum wage violations.  Petitioners allege that the Ministry of Labor never followed up on or enforced the citation through fines or other sanctions.  In another of the cases raised by petitioners, workers attempted to reorganize a union that existed at a banana plantation before it was destroyed by Hurricane Gamma after the plantation was taken over by new owners.  The new owners terminated the workers involved.  While the workers successfully filed complaints about the plantation's actions and obtained reinstatement orders, the employer complied only in part - rehiring a small fraction of the terminated employees, requiring workers to sign no-union pledges in violation of Honduran labor law and telling the workers that "troublemakers" would be excluded.  Petitioners cite reports issued by the U.S. Department of Labor to highlight the endemic problem of child labor in melon and coffee harvesting in Honduras.

The final set of cases raised by petitioners relate to declining working conditions in Honduras' main port, the Port of Puerto Cortès.  In recent years, wages for port workers have been reduced by 2/3, primarily through the termination of full-time employees and utilization of temporary agencies and short-term contracts.  Temporary port workers are now paid by the container, resulting in wages far below those set by Honduran law for non-agricultural workers.  Thus, enforcement of minimum wage laws has become an issue in an industry that once paid workers a wage that allowed them to afford a middle-class life.  Health and safety conditions have deteriorated along with wages.  Petitioners point to more accidents due to cost-cutting measures taken by sub-contractors in the provision of safety equipment and due to worker fatigue as a result of long hours.  According to the petition, port workers frequently work 12-hour shifts and sometimes work 24-36 hour shifts.  When port workers submit complaints to Honduran labor authorities about wage-and-hour and other workplace violations, their complaints are dismissed as being without proof, as port workers are not consistently provided with wage stubs.

Finally, petitioners argue that Honduras has failed to comply with its CAFTA-DR Chapter 16 obligation to enact labor laws in accordance with ILO standards.  In particular, petitioners point to a Honduran law requiring 6 months advance notice of a work stoppage in the public sector (a provision which may be applied to port workers in privatized companies) as well as a government decree issued on November 5, 2010 entitled "National Plan for Employment by Hours."  This decree, enacted in the wake of the economic crisis that began in September 2008, is a 3-year plan ostensibly designed to encourage the hiring of more workers through short-term and contract positions.  Petitioners argue that in practice, the decree weakens labor protections and is being utilized by employers to weaken unions and degrade working conditions in violation of Honduran law and ILO standards, as the right of temporary workers to organize unions is not guaranteed by Honduran law and the decree’s purpose of using temporary and short-term contracts to attract international investment conflicts with the CAFTA-DR Article 16.2.2 commitment that member states will not lower labor standards to attract foreign investment.

The Honduran CAFTA-DR petition highlights the challenge of raising living and working standards in an era of free trade.  USAID and USDOL have spent tens of millions of dollars in aid to Honduras and other Central American nations each year since the CAFTA-DR went into effect.  Much of this aid is geared toward improving the capacity of the Honduran Ministry of Labor to implement labor laws and erradicate longstanding problems like child labor in agriculture.  The experiment of the CAFTA-DR Chapter 16 labor provision is to determine whether the threat of trade sanctions will have an impact on labor law enforcement in Honduras and the rest of Central America.  These early test cases will also help determine whether intervention by USDOL through the investigatory and country-to-country dialogue processes can address regional issues such as the decline of labor standards in Central American ports as well as development of regional human resources strategies by private companies that conflict with ILO standards and labor laws of CAFTA-DR member states.

Under federal guidelines, the OTLA’s report should be completed within 180 days - around the middle of November 2012 - unless the OTLA determines that an extension is required.

Ireland - Proposed Reform of Workplace Resolution Structures

IRELAND: PROPOSED REFORM OF WORKPLACE RESOLUTION STRUCTURES

BY DEIRDRE LYNCH, SENIOR ASSOCIATE SOLICITOR, MATHESON ORMSBY PRENTICE, DUBLIN, IRELAND
1    The Background
The Irish government, in a decision of 15 November 2011, decided to reform the State’s existing employment rights and industrial relations bodies.  On 5 April 2012, the Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation published a document entitled “Blueprint to deliver a World-Class Workplace Relations Service” (the “Blueprint”), which details a number of significant measures which have been proposed in order to reform Ireland’s workplace relations structures and processes. 
That there has been a serious need to examine Ireland’s existing employment dispute resolution and adjudication mechanisms is beyond question. The current multi-forum system is complex and cumbersome.  Under the present system, an employee may bring a complaint that there has been a breach of his/her statutory rights to one or more of five statutory adjudication bodies.  Owing to the pressures on the system, there are significant delays in cases being notified to employers, being assigned a hearing date and in decisions being issued by the relevant deciding authority.  Such delays inevitably render it more difficult for employers to defend claims successfully. 
2    What Reforms are Proposed?
The Blueprint commits to implementing an overhaul of the current system by the end of 2012.  Whilst a number of the proposals are relatively simple and will be implemented with ease, a number are ambitious and radical and, as such, it is likely that there may be challenges in the initial stages.  I examine a number of the proposed measures below.
2.1  Reducing Complexity
From an overall perspective, the Blueprint seeks to simplify the current complex system in a number of ways.  This is to be welcomed.
2.1.1  Single Complaint and Appeals Form
It is proposed that a single complaint form would replace the thirty forms currently in use.  This form was launched on 4 January this year and work is being undertaken to facilitate the submission of the form online in order to increase the efficiency of the system.
Similarly, it is proposed that the twenty paper based appeal forms currently in use would be replaced with a single appeal form with online functionality.
2.1.2 A Two-tiered System
It is proposed to simplify the existing adjudication structures and introduce a two-tiered system whereby two independent statutory bodies, namely, the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) and the Labour Court, would replace the five bodies which currently hear statutory employment disputes.
The WRC will be the adjudicating body of first instance and will also assume responsibility for a number of other functions, including an advisory and information service and a conciliation and early resolution service.
The Labour Court, which currently deals with industrial relations issues and exercises an appellate function in certain matters, will hear appeals from decisions of the WRC.  The parties will have a right of appeal to the High Court on a point of law only.
2.2  Ensuring Consistency
A number of the proposals outlined in the Blueprint are aimed at ensuring a higher degree of consistency in the adjudication of employment law disputes.  Again, this is to be welcomed and should assist in advising clients on the merits of a particular claim.
2.2.1 Reasoned Decisions
As matters stand, the decisions which emanate from the various adjudication bodies vary in the level of detail provided regarding the reasons underlying the decision reached.  This obviously renders it difficult in some instances to advise clients regarding the merits of a particular claim.  Under the new proposals, a template will be produced which will require the WRC to outline the reason for its decision and the law which was applied in reaching that decision.  In my view, this is to be welcomed as it will assist greatly in advising clients, in particular, regarding the likelihood of success in any appeal.
2.2.2  Time Limits
At present, the time limits which apply to initiating a claim and the criteria for extending those time limits vary.  For example, under certain statutes the time limit may be extended if there were exceptional circumstances which prevented the lodging of the complaint, whilst in other statutes, the relevant standard for extension of time is reasonable cause.  Under the new system, there will be a common time limit for initiating claims and consistent criteria will be prescribed for the extension of those time limits.  Similarly, the current variation in the time limits for appealing against first instance decisions will be eliminated and a 42 day period for lodging appeals will apply under all employment statutes.
2.3  Accessibility of Information
The Blueprint outlines a number of measures aimed at making information regarding employment cases more readily accessible.  This should be of assistance in advising clients.
2.3.1  Information Website
A new website was launched on 4 January 2012 which brings together in one place relevant information on all aspects of employment rights and industrial relations.  This is likely to prove to be a useful reference point for both employers and employees.
2.3.2  Publication of Decisions
Under the current system, it is sometimes difficult to obtain copies of first instance decisions.  The reformed regime will require all first instance and appeal decisions to be published.  Again, this is a very welcome reform which will undoubtedly assist practitioners in advising their clients regarding the merits of a particular claim and the likelihood of a successful appeal.
2.4 Increasing the Efficiency of the System
Employment practitioners face considerable practical difficulties in advising clients by virtue of the very significant delays in the current system.  For example, it can take up to two years for a claim of discrimination/harassment under employment equality legislation to be heard.  Frequently, by the time that a case is heard, relevant witnesses may no longer be employed by the employer or even where they are still employed, their memory of the events forming the basis of the claim will have dimmed to the extent that the employer’s ability to defend successfully the claim in question is severely compromised.  In some cases, there is also a risk of increased compensation arising out the delays in the system.  In this respect, where an employee brings a claim of unfair dismissal, the relevant deciding body may award compensation for actual financial loss arising between the date of dismissal and the date of the hearing.  Given that it is taking approximately eighty weeks for unfair dismissal claims to be heard in some parts of Ireland, this is obviously resulting in increased levels of compensation being awarded in successful cases.
2.4.1 Elimination of Delays
A number of ambitious time periods for the processing of complaints are proposed.  It is undertaken that all complaints will be notified within five working days of the lodgement of the complaint.  The system aims to schedule hearings within three months of the complaint being lodged and proposes that 90% of first instance and appeal decisions will be issued in writing within twenty-eight working days. 
2.5  Encouragement of Early Resolution of Disputes
At present, it is possible to mediate claims of discrimination or harassment under employment equality legislation. However, as regards other employment disputes, the relevant legislation does not prescribe an option to mediate.  As such, unless the parties to a dispute agree to compromise a claim in advance of the hearing date, all claims proceed to hearing before the relevant deciding body.  For the first time in Ireland, an early resolution service will be available under the new regime.  This service has been introduced on a pilot basis.  It is designed as a voluntary system and the parties will not be disadvantaged in any way by availing of this service.  The obvious objective of this new service is to attempt to resolve cases at an early stage and thereby reduce the costs which would otherwise be incurred in proceeding to a hearing of the claim. 
3   Other Issues
3.1 Legal Qualification
One significant concern arising from the proposed system is the absence of any requirement that those who will adjudicate upon employment disputes, both at first instance and on appeal, should have a legal qualification.  Where an employee brings a claim against his or her employer, this may have serious implications for the employer’s business, both financial and also in terms of negative publicity and management time.  Given the time and resources which have been expended to date in designing the new system, it is somewhat peculiar that only the registrar, who will effectively be charged with an administrative function in managing complaints, need be an experienced and qualified lawyer. 
3.2 Pressure on Resources
An additional division will be added to the Labour Court.  However, even with this additional division, it is open to question whether the Labour Court will be sufficiently resourced to deal with the increased volume of work which it will be required to undertake pursuant to the new regime.  A consideration of the number of cases dealt with by the Labour Court and those dealt with by one of the current appellate bodies in 2010 suggests that additional resources may be necessary if the Labour Court is to be able to deliver the extremely expeditious service outlined in the Blueprint. 
4 Conclusion
The Minister will shortly seek a decision from the Irish government to draft the Workplace Relations (Law Reform) Bill 2012 to give legal effect to the reforms discussed above, which it is proposed will be enacted this autumn.  The draft scheme of the proposed legislation will be made available to stakeholders and the public for consideration while drafting proceeds.  Whether or not the proposals when enacted are capable of delivering the much needed but very ambitious reforms promised remains to be seen.  However, overall, the Blueprint is a first step in the right direction.   

New Zealand - Government Proposes Collective Bargaining Changes

New Zealand: Government Proposes Collective Bargaining Changes

Michael Quigg and Tim Sissons, Quigg Partners

Against a backdrop of recent well-publicised industrial unrest, New Zealand’s National Party-led government has signalled some significant changes to the country’s collective bargaining laws to:
·    Remove the requirement on parties to conclude a collective agreement unless there are genuine reasons, based on reasonable grounds, not to.

  • Allow employers to opt out of multi-employer collective bargaining.
  • Allow ‘partial pay for partial strikes’.
  • Remove the requirement that new employees are covered by any applicable collective agreement for their first 30 days of work.
  • Remove the ‘head start’ provided to unions in initiating bargaining.
· Require notice of any strike or lockout.

The government has also recently passed legislation making it compulsory for unions to hold secret ballots when workers are voting on whether or not to strike.

Removal of the Duty to Conclude Bargaining
In 2004, the then Labour-led government amended New Zealand’s Employment Relations Act 2000 to require unions and employers bargaining for collective agreements to conclude an agreement unless there was a genuine reason, based on reasonable grounds, not to.
The current National-led government is now proposing to remove this requirement, which it considers has led to protracted negotiations in situations where agreement clearly won’t be reached.
The consequences of bargaining being at an end are significant: it will often mean that industrial action becomes unlawful. It may also bring with it the expiry of the relevant collective agreement and the shift of the employees formerly covered the collective agreement to individual employment agreements. This has the potential to increase employers’ bargaining power by allowing them to negotiate with employees on an individual rather than collective basis.
The proposal has led to some discussion as to New Zealand’s international obligations under International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions, specifically ILO Convention 98, Article 4, which provides:
“Measures appropriate to national conditions shall be taken, where necessary, to encourage and promote the full development and utilisation of machinery for voluntary negotiation between employers or employers' organisations and workers' organisations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of collective agreements.”

Although it has been argued that the removal of the duty to conclude bargaining is inconsistent with this obligation, the general consensus appears to be that even without a duty to conclude, the Employment Relations Act 2000 contains sufficient measures to comply with this obligation. Indeed, there is some support for the proposition that the duty to conclude bargaining was itself inconsistent with ILO conventions in that it introduced a non-voluntary component into the bargaining process.

Multi-Employer Collective Bargaining Op-out
This proposed change again affects a provision introduced by the previous Labour-led government- in this case a provision allowing unions to bargain for a collective agreement coveringmore than one employer, known as a multi-employer collective agreement or MECA.
Under the proposed changes, it is expected that an employer which receives a notice commencing bargaining for a MECA would be entitled to opt out of such bargaining before it begins, and insist instead on bargaining for a single-employer agreement.
Partial Pay for Partial Strikes
Strikes can take any number of forms, from the wholesale cessation of work to ‘black bans’ and ‘go-slows’. Despite this variety, New Zealand case law has taken an all-or-nothing approach to the issue of pay: as long as the striking workers are performing somework, the employer has been faced with the choice of either suspending the workers (and not paying them) or allowing them to continue working (and paying them in full). Employers have voiced concern at this binary approach.
The proposed change would allow employers to offer partial pay when workers are partially striking.Although the change has intuitive appeal, finding an appropriate mechanism for determining the extent of the strike (and so the extent of the pay) may prove difficult.
30-day Rule
Currently, where an employee who isn’t a union member is employed in a role which is covered by a collective agreement, his or her terms and conditions of employment for the first 30 days are those of the collective agreement.If the employee joins the union, they continue to be covered by the collective agreement. If not, then they can enter into an individual employment agreement from the 31st day onwards.
The intention and effect of this ‘30-day rule’has been to encourage union membership- a core Labour Party policy. The current National Party-led government however is concerned that the rule weakens the negotiation position of employees who do not want to join a union - by the time they are able to negotiate the terms of an individual employment agreement, such employees have already accepted employment. The proposed changes would therefore remove the30-day rule and allow individual employment agreements to be entered into at the outset of employment.
Initiation of Bargaining

When a collective agreement is due to expire, the present system allows unions a head start in commencing bargaining for a new agreement: currently, a union can initiate bargaining 60 days before theprevious agreement expires, while employers cannot initiate bargaining any earlier than 40 days before expiry.

Indicating that it was concerned that the headstart created an imbalance in bargaining, the government has announced that it will level the playing field: in future the same (yet to be defined) time period will apply for both employers and unions.

Notice of Strikes and Lockouts

When bargaining is underway for a collective agreement, most union employees can currently strike without notice. Employers are similarly not required to give notice of lockouts. Advance warning is only required in respect of ‘essential services’like transport and power generation.
The government has now proposed that a requirement to give notice will apply across the board. The move is likely to be welcomed by employers (who will have the opportunity to make better alternative arrangements), but opposed by unions.
Secret Ballots
Not included within the proposed changes, but recently added to the statute books, is legislation making it compulsory for unions to hold secret ballots when workers vote on whether to strike. Most but not all unions already hold secret ballots when industrial action is being considered, but the amendment has formalisedthis into a strict requirement.

Next Steps

The proposed amendments are the most significant changes proposed to New Zealand’s collective bargaining arrangements since the election of the National-led government in 2008. With the changes now having received Cabinet approval, draft legislation (and the public debate which is likely to accompany it) is anticipated in the second half of the year.



Spain - New Labour Legislation

New Labour Legislation in Spain

By Sonia Cortes, Cuatrecasa, Goncalves Pereira

The Spanish government recently approved new legislation[1] aiming at providing employers the means to face the difficult financial situation. The new legislation brings significant changes to employment law, particularly extending flexibility at work and easening both individual termination and collective redundancy requirements. It represents the most relevant labour reform since the Workers’ Statute was approved in 1981. The practical enforcement in the few months the reform has been in force shows that employers have won considerable leverage in enforcing changes to employment or terminations and that employees are more prepared to settle cases before litigation.

The new law eases enforcement of changes to employment terms, aiming at further flexibility at work, including job mobility, work site move and other relevant changes to working conditions.
(a) Floating working time.- The labour reform grants employers the right to freely change up to 5% of employees’ annual working time, ie approx 90 hours per year to conform to business needs. This is only subject to mandatory rest time (12 hour night rest, etc) and to the company’s annual schedule, ie. no weekend work can be enforced through this system if the company schedule does not provide for weekend work (unless otherwise agreed). This allows greater flexibility at work. It entails a very relevant improvement for employers’, given that very few collective bargaining agreements provided for similar rights (eg chemical industry) and thus before the labour reform employers needed agreement with employee representatives to achieve this floating time right (which in practice required consideration in exchange for this right and was usually subject to limitation).
(b) Changes to job description.- Employers may freely move employees to other positions in the same group, since the reference to the 'group' is much wider than the previous more stringent category reference. Again, this entails considerable flexibility at work and overcomes the prior rigidity resulting from narrow interpretation by the courts.
(c) Office move.- The standard of justification to move employees to other locations is now less stringent. The labour authority is no longer entitled to order a 6-month stay on a collective work site move.
(d) Substantial modification of working conditions.- Less stringent standards of justification are required. This overcomes the difficulties to change working conditions resulting from the very narrow interpretation held by Spanish courts in the past. The modification of certain conditions (salary, working day, working system, etc.) can be implemented by the company unless provided in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Besides, changes are only deemed to be collective if the threshold of employees involved is exceeded, rather than the previous reference to the individual or collective origin of the right. Individual substantial modifications require a shorter notice period (15-day notice instead of 30 day notice).
(e) Part-time employment.- Part-time employment has been amended to allow part-time employees to work overtime, in addition to the so-called additional hours –horas complementarias- (which were very limited). This allows considerably more flexibility and as a result part-time employment may become a very interesting tool for flexibility at work.
(a) Company CBAs are recognized to have priority over any other CBA with regards to certain matters (base salary and salary supplements, schedule and working time distribution, professional classification adjustment to the company situation, work-life balance measures, etc.).
(b) A time limit of 2 years has been set for negotiations for renewal of expired CBAs, during which CBAs continue to be in force, thus setting a time limit to CBA enforcement, which formerly dragged on indefinitely thus removing employers’ leverage. With the new law, after two years of unsuccessful negotiations, the former CBA of a broader scope (typically the national CBA for the industry, if any) becomes effective.
(c) Employers may decide not to apply all or part of the relevant company or industry CBA, subject to agreement with employee representatives after a 15-day consultation term, notification to the labour authority, and subject to their being sustained business grounds. Economic grounds have been defined as for collective redundancy (see 3.c.i), although income decrease for two consecutive quarters (instead of 3 for collective redundancies) is deemed justifying grounds. However, if the company fails to reach an agreement with local employee representatives, a very complex and almost unenforceable procedure follows. This procedure involves submission of consultation to the CBA interpretation commission and either arbitration or submission to the National Consultation CBA Commission.
a.         Termination without cause.- Termination without cause no longer entitles employees to salaries during litigation (which used to imply a 6 month salary cost for employers in addition to severance). This grants employers much stronger leverage in termination litigation and negotiation for settlement, since the employee will no longer be receiving severance upfront as was the case before to avoid those salaries. In fact, in the event of litigation, the employee will not be receiving severance for around six months and even eighteen months if the employer appeals. This is creating much broader opportunities for the parties to settle termination disputes before litigation and for amounts below the usual practice in the past.  
b.         Termination Severance.- The standard severance for termination without cause has been reduced from the previous 45 days’ salary per year of service (capped at 42 months) to 33 days’ salary per year of service, (capped at 24 months). For current employees, this applies as of 12 February 2012 and thus their previous seniority still accounts at 45 days’ salary per year of service up to such date and at 33 days’ salary per year of service thereon. The resulting severance is capped at 24 months’ salary, except where the stand-alone previous accrued seniority exceeds this amount (which takes place for seniorities over 14 years), in which case the old 42 months’ salary per year of service applies.
c.         Business Grounds Termination.- The grounds (economic, technical, organizational or productive) justifying business termination have been considerably eased. Economic reasons occur where the company is under a “negative economic situation”, usually but not necessarily related to the company’s current or foreseen losses and there is a persistent decrease in the company’s income. Such a decrease is deemed to be persistent if it takes place during 3 consecutive quarters. As for productive, technical and organizational grounds, the law simply requires changes thereto. The law no longer requires the company to prove the reasonableness of the dismissal as a measure to prevent a negative performance of the company or to ensure the company’s viability or competitiveness. Termination based on these grounds entitles employees to 20 days’ salary per year of service, capped at 12 months’ pay, which remains unchanged.
d.         Collective redundancy.- Collective redundancy has considerably changed.
ii.         The former requirement to obtain prior authorization by employment authorities has been removed. Employers may now implement collective redundancies provided business grounds (economic, technical, organizational or productive) occur and following a 15 or 30-day consultation term with employee representatives (consultation term depending on whether the company has more or less than 50 employees).
iii.        The redundancy plan may be challenged in labour courts, but limited grounds for challenge exist. The main risk now is that the redundancy may be declared null and void if the consultation procedure or other procedural requirements are not followed or if the selection criteria are discriminatory. However should court declare the plan to be unlawful due to lack of justifying grounds, the consequence is simply that the severance of 33 (or 45) days’ salary per year of service, capped at 24 months’ salary applies, instead of the 20 days salary per year of service, capped at 12 monthly payments.
iv.        The fact that implementation is easier, risks minor and that the company may implement the redundancy plan with no need to have the work force’s support or the authorities approval places the company in a much stronger position, thus removing the need (as was the case under the previous legislation) to give in to paying higher severance in order to avoid risks.
v.         A relocation plan for at least 6 months is to be implemented for redundancies involving more than 50 employees. This plan should include social measures for redeployment such as outplacement, relocation, training, etc. The implementation of the social plan is subject to judicial review.
vi.        A number of procedural requirements that were implemented in 2011 still apply, including the need for the employer to disclose related affiliates’ annual accounts in the event of economic grounds or to justify the selection criteria.
The following issues also result from the labour reform:
(a) New contract of employment to hire employees on training under 30 years of age for a maximum term of 3 years, having relevant social security contribution reductions;
(b) New contract of employment for employers with less than 50 employees, having a 12 month probationary term[2] and entitling the employer to relevant social security discounts
(c) Teleworking employees to be assigned to employer job centres
(d) Measures regarding work-life balance.
This new legislation provides interesting opportunities for employers to conform their workforce to business needs, thus providing a much better framework legislation for businesses in Spain. The experience of this legislation short enforcement shows a clear improvement in employers’ leverage in the employment relationship.





                                                                                      


[1] Royal Decree Act 3/2012 on Urgent Measures regarding the Labour Market
[2] This term might be eventually amended